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the ability to resolve response   interference within a trial which may 
involve selective inhibition of the automatic response to reduce inter-
ference between competing actions (Simon and Wolf, 1963; Simon 
and Rudell, 1967; Forstmann et al., 2008a,b). Interestingly, when 
zooming in on trial-by-trial adjustments, it becomes evident that 
the interference effect is reduced after I compared to C trials (Gratton 
et al., 1992). This ﬁ  nding refers to the so-called conﬂ  ict adaptation 
effect, or Gratton effect, which can be quantiﬁ  ed as the difference of 
the interference effect following incongruent trials (iI–iC), subtracted 
from the interference effect following congruent trials (cI–cC). For 
brevity, in the following text we will use a lower case to denote the 
previous trial and an upper case to denote the current trial.
An inﬂ  uential theory capturing the conﬂ  ict adaptation effect 
is the conﬂ  ict monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick et al., 1999, 2001, 
2004; but see also Mansouri et al., 2009). It proposes that in order 
to resolve response conﬂ  ict, the presence of this conﬂ  ict must 
ﬁ  rst be detected and evaluated. Subsequently, cognitive control 
is implemented in order to overcome the detected conﬂ  ict. Once 
control processes are activated they can also act on the following 
trial: when the subsequent trial is again incongruent, the already 
implemented control processes lead to an advantage in overcoming 
conﬂ  ict. Hence, faster reaction times (RTs) are observed on iI trials 
compared to cI trials which results in an overall reduction of the 
interference effect after I trials compared to C trials.
The activation of conﬂ  icting response tendencies is typically 
accompanied by activation of posterior brain areas within the 
medial frontal cortex, most prominently the rostral cingulate zone 
(RCZ; for review see Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a). Selecting the task-
appropriate action is more demanding when competing alterna-
tive actions are activated on the basis of task-irrelevant stimulus 
INTRODUCTION
In our daily lives, we need to selectively control and adjust our 
behavior. Wrong choices may instantly appeal to us, and yet we 
override these in order to respond based on what we have learned 
is right. This is indicative of how our brain selects responses: auto-
matic bottom-up processes capture our action system, based on 
salient stimulus properties or strong impulses, and top-down action 
control is applied, based on intentions, instructions, and previous 
experience. Understanding the actions of others may be central 
to the human condition. Evolutionary thinkers believe that much 
of the improved cognitive abilities that humans and other apes 
possess, originate from the adaptive advantage of understand-
ing and predicting the cognition and behavior of our peers; the 
Machiavellian intelligence hypotheses (Byrne and Whiten, 1988; 
Whiten and Byrne, 1997). Here we ask what happens if the previous 
experience that lead us to implement control is not our own behav-
iour, but rather derived from performance observed in another. And 
more speciﬁ  cally, how do we tune our behavior to that of others? 
This study set out to answer these questions by zooming in on 
trial-by-trial adjustments using a social interference task.
Trial-to-trial adjustments have been studied with different inter-
ference tasks such as the Stroop task, the Eriksen ﬂ  anker task, and 
stimulus-response compatibility tasks such as the Simon task (e.g., 
Pardo et al., 1990; Hazeltine et al., 2003; Schumacher et al., 2007). In 
such tasks, responses are typically slowed on incongruent (I) trials, 
that is, when the relevant aspect of the stimulus requires a response 
opposite to the response triggered by task-irrelevant stimulus aspects, 
rather than when the activated responses overlap, as on congruent 
(C) trials. The magnitude of the behavioral interference effect of 
congruence (i.e., I trials–C trials) is often considered as a measure for 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty healthy volunteers (22–28  years old, µ  =  24, σ = 1.65) 
were recruited from the student population of the University of 
Amsterdam. The subjects were all right handed as assessed by the 
Edinburgh Inventory (Oldﬁ  eld,  1971). Informed consent was 
obtained prior to the experiment. The experiment was approved 
by the local ethics committee of the University of Amsterdam, and 
all procedures were conducted in accordance with relevant laws and 
institutional guidelines. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Subject reported having no history of neurologi-
cal, major medical, or psychiatric disorder. Due to an error in the 
computer setup, no response markers were introduced in the EEG 
dataﬁ  les during the testing of ﬁ  ve subjects. As a result, only the 
behavioral data from these subjects are reported. An additional 
behavioral session was acquired for 17 of the 20 subjects.
PROCEDURE
Instructions
Subjects were instructed that they were to perform in a task that was 
interspersed with trials previously recorded from another person 
performing in the same task. In reality, they observed computer 
generated behavior. The subjects were shown a picture and were 
given a name of the ﬁ  ctional other subject. Names of ﬁ  ctional sub-
jects were matched in length to the names of the subjects participat-
ing in the experiment. Note that subjects were explicitly informed 
about the non-competitive nature of the experiment. Moreover, 
subjects were instructed not to respond during the other’s trials, 
unless the other made an error. The latter trials served as catch trials. 
Before the experiment started the subjects were also photographed 
to increase the plausibility that their own data would be used as 
an ‘other’ for a future subject. Subjects had already performed this 
task for 40 min previously, and subjects were allowed to practice 
the task for 10 min before the experiment began.
Debrieﬁ  ng and questionnaire
After performing the experimental session, subjects ﬁ  lled out a 
visual analog scale questionnaire. The questions were set up to 
probe the subjects’ representation of the other player, without 
directly asking their belief in the manipulation. Once the subjects 
had ﬁ  lled out this questionnaire, they were informed about the 
deception, and asked directly whether they had believed it. Their 
answer to this ﬁ  nal question was rated on a 5-point scale, which 
was included in the overall measure of the strength of the subjects’ 
representation of the other, ranging from 0 to 1.
Behavioral task
Subjects performed a social version of the Simon task (Simon 
and Wolf, 1963) with four blocks of 320 trials each. Throughout 
the experiment, two buttons were visualized in the lower left and 
lower right of the screen, a visual angle of 5.6° apart (see Figure 1). 
A white central ﬁ  xation cross was presented on a black background 
for 1000 ms, followed by a 500 ms cue (the subject’s name or the 
other), indicating who was to perform the upcoming trial. This 
cue was followed by a ﬁ  xation cross for 800 ms, and then the target 
appeared, lasting for 1000 ms. Targets were ﬁ  lled circles of one of 
four colors (red and green for a right response, blue and yellow for 
 features. Such processes of action selection are typically associated 
with activation in dorsal brain areas within the medial frontal cor-
tex, most prominently the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA; for review see Nachev et al., 2008). Under more demanding 
circumstances, additional activation is observed in lateral prefrontal 
cortex (LPFC; for review see Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008). 
Studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine 
the Gratton effect have shown that RCZ activation associated with 
conﬂ  icting response tendencies is followed by activation in LPFC 
(e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns, 2006), presumably as a means of 
increased proactive top-down guidance of action selection proc-
esses after conﬂ  ict has been experienced, such that further response 
capture by task-irrelevant stimulus features is pre-empted.
Action selection processes, especially when facing conﬂ  icting 
response tendencies, are expressed in event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs) obtained from frontocentral scalp sites. Although it is not 
always clear whether these manifestations reﬂ  ect activation in pre-
SMA or in the directly underlying RCZ, frontocentral ERPs are con-
sistently modulated by factors that place differential demands on 
action selection, most typically in the time window of the so-called 
N2 (for review see Folstein and van Petten, 2008). Many studies 
have examined these modulations in the context of conﬂ  icts tasks, 
expressed in a negative shift in the frontocentral ERPs in the N2 
time range (e.g., Heil et al., 2000). This negative shift is modulated 
by the Gratton effect, such that the negative shift was considerable 
after congruent trials but much reduced after incongruent trials, 
mirroring the RT results (Leuthold and Schröter, 2006). This pat-
tern again suggests pre-emptive control after experienced conﬂ  ict, 
such that action selection is subsequently less affected by response 
capture from task-irrelevant stimulus features.
In the present study, we introduce a social version of the Simon 
task, where during half of the trials, the subjects observe another 
person’s response instead of responding themselves. This allows us 
to examine trial-by-trial adjustments, after having observed behavior 
of someone else compared to the adjustments after performing the 
task oneself. According to the simulation account (Gallese et al., 2004; 
Ramnani and Miall, 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Decety and Grèzes, 
2006) the observation of another person’s behavior induces internal 
states in the observer that are similar to those that would occur if the 
observer undertook the action himself. Interestingly, these internal 
states are also evoked if the other’s actions are not directly observed, 
but heard or suggested instead (Umiltá et al., 2001; Kohler et al., 2002). 
These ﬁ  ndings suggest that it is not simply perceiving an action, but 
knowing that it takes place, that evokes these states. As such, we expect 
that observing the Simon task in another will also evoke response con-
ﬂ  ict in the observer. Therefore, we examine whether the Gratton effect 
as obtained after self-experienced response conﬂ  ict is also obtained 
after observing the performance of someone else.
Two hypotheses are formulated: ﬁ  rst, we expect to ﬁ  nd compa-
rable trial-to-trial adjustments in the shape of a behavioral Gratton 
effect after the observation of someone else or after performing 
oneself. Second, we expect the negative shift in the frontocentral 
ERPs in the N2 time range to be modulated by the Gratton effect, 
such that a negative shift is observed after congruent but not incon-
gruent trials. Again, this modulation should be comparable after 
having observed someone else compared to having performed the 
task oneself on the previous trial.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 57  |  3
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a left response). Targets appeared to the left or right of ﬁ  xation, 
above either the left or the right button. The distance between 
the ﬁ  xation cross and the target covered a visual angle of 2.8°. 
Responses were either generated by the computer, or made by the 
subject using response buttons, depending on the trial type (self 
or other). The selected response was visualized by pressing and 
depressing the corresponding button on the screen. After a delay 
of 400 ms, a new trial began.
The sequence of trial conditions was produced randomly, with sev-
eral constraints: the subject’s trials comprised eight types (2 × 2 × 2), 
as determined by the player of the previous trial (s/o), the congruency 
of the previous trial (c/i), and the congruency of the current trial 
(C/I). The experiment was set up so that each of the eight resulting 
combinations occurred equally often. Also, consecutive trials never 
used the same color, to avoid stimulus repetition effects and hence 
precluding an interpretation of the Gratton effect in terms of repeti-
tion priming (e.g., Wühr and Ansorge, 2005). To allow for this, two 
colors were mapped to each response direction. The other’s RT was 
drawn from a uniform distribution between 220 and 460 ms.
Moreover, six catch trials were included per block which ensured 
the subjects’ attention during the other’s trials as well as a high eco-
logical validity. A third response button (under the middle ﬁ  nger of 
the right hand) was dedicated to responding to these catch trials.
DATA ANALYSIS
Behavior
For both the RT and the electrophysiological analyses, we removed 
both the error and catch trials, as well as the trials immediately 
following these. The remaining trials were categorized into one of 
eight categories (scC, scI, siC, siI, ocC, ocI, oiC, oiI). Note that in all 
of these conditions, the subject performs the task, and that it is only 
the self/other condition of the previous trial that varies. The Gratton 
effect was determined as the interaction effect between the congru-
ency of the current trial and the congruency on the previous trial. 
Error rates were also computed for each of these eight trial types. 
RT and error rates were analyzed using SPSS 17 (SPSS Inc.).
Electrophysiology
Electrophysiological data was recorded using the ‘Biosemi active 
two’ acquisition system (Biosemi B.V., the Netherlands), record-
ing from 32 scalp electrodes placed according to the 10/20 system 
(Jasper, 1958). Additionally, horizontal and vertical eye movements 
were recorded, next to the canthus of the left and right eye, and 
above and below the left eye. An electrode placed on the left earlobe 
was used as a reference signal.
The data was analyzed using Brain Vision Analyzer (v.1.05.0005, 
Brain Products GmbH, Germany). The raw data was downsampled 
to 512 Hz. The data were initially band-pass ﬁ  ltered with a lower 
cut-off of 0.5 Hz (12 dB/octave) and an upper cut-off of 20 Hz 
(48 dB/octave). Any noisy segments were located by visual inspec-
tion and removed. Eye-movement artifacts were isolated using 
Independent Component Analysis, and subsequently removed 
from the data (Vigario, 1997; Hyvarinen and Oja, 2000; Iriarte 
et al., 2003; Wijnen and Ridderinkhof, 2009). ERPs were aligned to 
a baseline of the 200 ms prior to target onset (t = 0 ms). The data 
were exported from Brain Vision Analyzer, and the values for Fz 
and Cz were analyzed using SPSS.
Frontocentral ERPs in the N2 time window (between 200 and 
400 ms) were expected to show greater negativity in cI compared 
to cC trials. We identiﬁ  ed such a shift based on the difference waves 
FIGURE 1 | Social Simon task. Schematical drawing of the social Simon task. 
Each trial started with the presentation of a name cue. In the self condition, 
participants saw their own name presented on the middle of the screen. In the 
other condition, participants received a name of someone else. This name 
signaled that participants had to observe the behavior of this person and were 
not required to press a response button when the Simon stimuli were presented. 
In both the self and the other condition, participants viewed two response panels 
that were presented below the colored Simon stimuli. According to the response 
button that was pressed by the participants themselves, the spatially-compatible 
visually presented response panel was highlighted. In the other condition, one of 
the visually presented response panels was also highlighted indicating the other 
persons’ response. Four different colored circles were used that were presented 
either on the right or left side of the central ﬁ  xation cross, respectively. Green and 
red circles were mapped to a left response button press whereas yellow and blue 
circles were mapped to a right response button press. There were either 
congruent, i.e. color and spatial location overlap, or incongruent conditions, i.e. 
color or spatial location do not overlap. No stimulus repetitions were allowed. 
Cue-trial and inter-trial intervals are not depicted for sake of clarity.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 57  |  4
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of cI and cC. This negative shift occurred between 270 and 400 ms, 
and peaked at 328 ms (see Figure 3). We selected the area between 
300 and 350 ms to zoom into this timespan. Adopting a procedure 
previously used in a number of similar studies (Kopp et al., 1996; 
Heil et al., 2000; Bartholow et al., 2005; Leuthold and Schröter, 
2006) we analyzed the interval by computing the average voltage 
over the timespan.
The P3 component of the ERP follows the N2. Because the P3 
spans a wide time interval and shows a broad scalp distribution, 
it shows partial overlap with the N2 both temporally and spatially 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Yeung et al., 2004). In order to minimize 
the effects of this overlap on our analyses, we also ﬁ  ltered the data 
again to exclude the slow P3 component, using a band-pass ﬁ  lter 
with a lower cut-off of 3.5 Hz (12 dB/octave) and an upper cut-off 
of 20 Hz (48 dB/octave), (Donkers and van Boxtel, 2004; Wijnen 
and Ridderinkhof, 2009). Afterwards, we repeated our analysis of 
the negativity. We also computed the highest negative peak between 
200 and 400 ms on the individual cI–cC difference waves, to acquire 
an individual measure of the latency of the ERP negativity.
Bayesian analysis
In the remainder of the statistical analyses, we report Bayesian pos-
terior probabilities in addition to conventional p-values on the ERP 
and the behavioral data to show that the effects for self and for other 
were identical. When we assume, for fairness, that the null hypothesis 
and the alternative hypothesis are equally plausible a priori, a default 
Bayesian t-test (Wetzels et al., 2009) allows one to determine the pos-
terior plausibility of the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis. 
We denote the posterior probability for the null hypothesis as pBayes(H0). 
When, for example, pBayes(H0) = 0.9, this means that the plausibility 
for the null hypothesis has increased from 0.5 to 0.9, and the plau-
sibility of the alternative hypothesis has correspondingly decreased 
from 0.5 to 0.1. We report these posterior probabilities because they 
address several problems both with conventional p-values and with 
prep (Wagenmakers, 2007; Iverson et al., 2008a,b). Most importantly, 
posterior probabilities allow one to directly quantify evidence in favor 
of the null hypothesis, instead of only ‘failing to reject’ it. In the case 
of our analyses, we perform a one-sample Bayesian t-test on the dif-
ference scores of two measures (following self and following other), 
because we want to show the posterior probability that they are the 
same. This relates directly to our hypotheses following the simulation 
account, proposing that the same behavioral and neural modulations 
occur following own, and following observed behavior.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Average RT was 572 ms (σ = 42). Average ER was 0.037 (σ = 0.023). 
The average strength subjects’ representation of the other was 
0.54 (σ = 0.17).
We performed two repeated-measures ANOVAs, one with RT as 
the dependent variable, and one with error rate as the dependent 
variable. Both analyses used previous congruency, current congru-
ency, and previous self/other condition as independent variables.
The only signiﬁ  cant result was found for the interaction effect 
between previous congruency and current congruency on RT, 
with a larger Simon effect following congruent, than following 
incongruent trials [F(1,19) = 6.147, p = 0.023] (See Figure 2A). 
FIGURE 2 | Reaction time results. Shown here are the subjects’ average RT 
as a function of congruency of the previous trial (x-axis) and congruency of the 
current trial (colored lines). (A) shows the RT data for all trials, (B) for the trials 
following self trials only, and (C) for trials following other trials only. The bars 
represent the standard error of the mean, computed over the RT normalized 
per subject (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
There was a marginal main effect of previous congruency on 
error rates [F(1,19) = 3.924, p = 0.062], with error rates being 
higher following incongruent (0.049) than following congruent 
trials (0.043).
When split for following self and following other trials, the inter-
action effect on RT between current and previous congruency was 
marginally signiﬁ  cant following self [F(1,19) = 3.67, p = 0.070], and 
marginally signiﬁ  cant following other [F(1,19) = 3.07, p = 0.096]. 
The directions of these two interactions are the same (Figures 2B,C). 
Bayesian analysis on the size of the Gratton effect following self and 
following other trials revealed that there was no difference between 
the two [t(19) = 0.595, p = 0.559, pBayes(H0) = 0.83]. No other tests 
revealed signiﬁ  cant effects (F < 1).
Note that no main effects of current congruency on RT or ER 
(i.e. Simon effects) were found in our behavioral data. However, 
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2007; Tsai et al., 2008). Based upon the simulation account, we 
  hypothesized that we would observe a similar Gratton effect fol-
lowing a   subject’s own conﬂ  ict, and following the observation of 
conﬂ  ict in another.
Most importantly, our results show a similar Gratton effect fol-
lowing performed, and observed conﬂ  ict. This is in line with our 
hypothesis that subjects implement lasting control when observing 
a conﬂ  ict situation in another’s behavior. The presence of control in 
subjects’ own behavior after an observed incongruent trial suggests 
that subjects also simulate conﬂ  ict during that observed trial. This 
ﬁ  nding suggests that when we observe someone else performing 
a conﬂ  icting task, we experience conﬂ  ict ourselves. The fact that 
we ﬁ  nd frontocentral negative shifts in the ERP, which match the 
Gratton effect on RT supports this notion and indicates that difﬁ  -
culties in action selection, as triggered by salient but task-irrelevant 
stimulus features, are pre-empted by response conﬂ  ict in the previ-
ous trial, regardless of whether that conﬂ  ict was self-experienced or 
simulated based on the observed performance of someone else.
The Gratton effect we observed on RT did not retain statistical 
signiﬁ  cance when split for self and other. However, we did ﬁ  nd 
marginal signiﬁ  cance in both these split conditions, and the absence 
of a three-way interaction effect between self/other, previous, and 
current congruency suggests that our signiﬁ  cant Gratton effect was 
not speciﬁ  cally driven by only the following self, or only the follow-
ing other trials. Further support for this notion is provided by our 
Bayesian analysis. We found high posterior Bayesian probability, 
showing that the effects following self and following other were 
the same. Therefore, we suggest that the Gratton effects following 
self and following other trials are similar.
At ﬁ  rst glance, the present data seem to be inconsistent with 
previous ﬁ  ndings. First, we did not obtain a Simon effect on either 
RT or error rates. Second, compared to previous ERP results, our 
frontocentral negativity occurs slightly later than the N2 peak 
normally found in the Simon task. One explanation for the afore-
mentioned discrepancies might be the overall prolonged RTs as 
compared to classical Simon tasks. In our experiment, the mean RT 
was 572 ms whereas in classical Simon tasks mean RTs are much 
shorter, e.g., 473 ms (Hommel, 1994); 485 ms (Notebaert et al., 
2001), or 496 ms (Hommel et al., 2004). As such, responses in our 
modiﬁ  ed experiment were 75–100 ms slower than in the basic 
Simon task. Previous experiments have shown that increasing the 
delay between stimulus presentation and response decreases the 
Simon effect (Simon et al., 1976). Another study has demonstrated 
that increasing the complexity of the stimulus used in the Simon 
tasks results in longer RTs, as well as a complete abolishment of the 
Simon effect (Hommel, 1994). Increasing the size of the stimulus 
set mapped to each response hand also increases RT and decreases 
the overall Simon effect (Hommel, 1995). Note that an increased 
stimulus set size is also present in our experiment, because we use 
two colors mapped to each response hand. Further evidence for the 
phenomenon of decreased Simon effects with slower responses is 
found in research looking into RT distributions. In these types of 
analyses, the size of the interference effect is determined separately 
across different Vincentized time bins (De Jong et al., 1994). The 
results typically show strong Simon effects in fast response bins, 
and progressively smaller, even negative Simon effects in slower 
response bins (Burle et  al., 2002; Ridderinkhof et  al., 2004b). 
and during the previously recorded behavioral session using the 
same paradigm show a signiﬁ   cant correlation [R(17) = 0.584, 
p = 0.007 (one-sided)].
EEG RESULTS
Visual inspection of frontocentral ERPs suggests that, as expected, 
I trials were associated with a greater negativity in the N2 time 
window (between 200 and 400 ms) than C trials (see Figure 3A). 
Modulations of this effect by the congruity of the preceding trial 
were examined by determining area averages in the difference waves 
cI–cC versus iI–iC. A substantial negative shift occurred in the 
cI–cC difference wave between 270 and 400 ms, peaking at 328 ms. 
Voltage maps conﬁ  rmed the frontocentral scalp distribution of 
this negative shift (see Figure 3C). Notably, such a negative shift 
was conspicuously absent in the iI–iC difference wave. Repeated-
measures ANOVAs on the average EEG amplitude between 300 
and 350 ms were computed separately for the electrodes of inter-
est, Fz and Cz. The average amplitude of the negative shift at Fz 
shows a signiﬁ  cant interaction effect between current congru-
ency and previous congruency [F(1,14) = 9.962, p = 0.007] (see 
Figure 3B). The average amplitude of Cz shows a similar Gratton 
effect [F(1,14) = 6.175, p = 0.026]. P2 amplitudes showed no sig-
niﬁ  cant effects (all p > 0.1).
The same analysis was repeated for ERPs with the P3 ﬁ  ltered 
out. The results were comparable, and more reliable. The aver-
age amplitude of Fz shows a signiﬁ  cant interaction effect between 
current congruency and previous congruency [F(1,14) = 17.375, 
p = 0.001], as does the average amplitude of Cz [F(1,14) = 12.189, 
p = 0.004].
The interaction effect on Fz was signiﬁ  cant in the trials following 
self trials [F(1,14) = 6.527, p = 0.023], and in trials following other 
trials [F(1,14) = 6.232, p = 0.026]. The interaction effect on Cz was 
also signiﬁ  cant in the trials following self trials [F(1,14) = 4.960, 
p = 0.043], and in trials following other trials [F(1,14) = 4.638, 
p = 0.049]. Bayesian analysis revealed that the N2 effect across 
the four trial types were identical for previous self and previous 
other on both Fz [t(14) = 0.19, p = 0.86, pBayes(H0) = 0.83] and Cz 
[t(14) = −0.38, p = 0.71, pBayes(H0) = 0.83]. Also, there is no differ-
ence between the interaction effect following self and following 
other trials for Fz [t(14) = −0.6, p = 0.55, pBayes(H0) = 0.81], and 
Cz [t(14) = −0.64, p = 0.53, pBayes(H0) = 0.81].
The average latency of the individual maximum difference 
between cI–cC was 341 ms (σ = 33 ms). These latencies showed a 
signiﬁ  cant positive correlation with individual RTs [R(15) = 0.597, 
p = 0.018 (two-tailed)].
DISCUSSION
The present study set out to investigate adaptive control mecha-
nisms based on observed behavior. More speciﬁ  cally, using a Simon 
task, we measured the Gratton effect, which is a modulation of the 
interference effect of the current trial by the congruency condition 
of the previous trial. According to the simulation account, subjects 
attempt to understand the behavior of others by utilizing their 
own neural circuitry to simulate the mental processing underly-
ing that behavior. Such a view has been ﬁ  rmly established in the 
domain of motor actions, but several studies have extended it to 
cognitive processing (van Schie et al., 2004; Schuch and Tipper, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 57  |  6
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FIGURE 3 | ERP results. (A) ERP results on the ﬁ  ltered signal from Fz, Fc2, Fc1 
and Cz in rows, separated by previous condition (self/other x congruent/
incongruent) in columns. Blue lines represent current congruent trials, red lines 
represent current incongruent trials, and gray lines represents the difference 
wave of I–C. Note the difference between cI and cC trials between 300 and 
350 ms which is absent in iI and iC trials. (B) The Gratton effect on the ERP 
amplitude of Fz, split for following self and following other trials. The average 
EEG amplitude is plotted as a function of congruency of the previous trial (x-axis) 
and congruency of the currents trial (lines). Bars represent the standard error of 
the mean, computed over the amplitude, as normalized per subject. (C) Voltage 
map of the difference wave of cC and cI trials. Note the frontocentral scalp 
distribution of the negativity.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 57  |  7
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error slowing (Schuch and Tipper, 2007). Our results and the results 
mentioned above can be considered to form a   cognitive version of 
the simulation account, which proposes that we understand the 
cognitive processes of others by simulating them; generating a repre-
sentation similar to that we would use ourselves (Gallese et al., 2004; 
Ramnani and Miall, 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Decety and Grèzes, 
2006). This hypothesis is based upon the discovery of the mirror 
neuron system (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996), and 
the simulation account has been ﬁ  rmly established in the visuomo-
tor domain. The system is thought to serve both to understand the 
actions of others, and likely also to facilitate learning through imita-
tion (Rizzolatti, 2005). Research outside the motor domain indicates 
that the simulation account also holds for emotional states, such as 
disgust (Phillips et al., 1997; Calder et al., 2000; Small et al., 2003; 
see Gallese et al., 2004, for a review). According to the simulation 
account, in order to understand observed behavior, we represent 
observed actions as if they are our own. The ﬁ  nding that we adapt 
our subsequent behavior in the form of the Gratton effect indicates 
that this is also the case for observed conﬂ  ict. Combined with the 
aforementioned results, this leads us to conclude that the simulation 
account also applies to cognitive control.
To summarize, the use of our novel paradigm has allowed us to 
show the existence of sustained control processes in the brain and 
behavior of the observer of an action. These results indicate that 
we represent observed conﬂ  ict as if it were our own.
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Negative Simon effects also occur following incongruent trials in 
several experimental manipulations, resulting in a net Simon effect 
of 0 in these conditions (Stürmer et al., 2002). This demonstrates 
that the reliability of the Gratton effect does not depend on the 
presence of a Simon effect.
We believe that such an increase in RTs might also account for 
the present results in that it caused participants to respond more 
slowly, thereby evading the early response capture process. Less 
response capture would also explain the missing Simon effect on 
error rates since most incongruent errors are committed during 
very fast responses. Interestingly, although the Simon effect is abol-
ished in our data, the Gratton effect is maintained.
In addition to the behavioral consequences, the slower responses 
may also explain why the frontocentral negativity in the ERP is 
delayed compared to the commonly reported N2 peak. We propose 
that the frontocentral negativity might reﬂ  ect the same processes 
underlying the N2 component; however, these processes are delayed 
due to complexity of the task. This results in a modulation of the slope 
between N2 and P3 instead. To support this notion, we analyzed the 
latency of our ERP effect on the subject-speciﬁ  c level by applying 
peak detection on subject-speciﬁ  c cI–cC difference waves. We found 
that the latency of subjects’ frontocentral negativity correlated posi-
tively with their mean RT. This ﬁ  nding corroborates the idea that the 
latency of the frontocentral negativity is dependent on mean RT.
Our results complement other recent ﬁ  ndings in social cognitive 
control. For instance, subjects who perform half a Simon task (by 
using only one response button) show an interference effect when 
they believe the other button is operated by a human, but not when 
they believe it is operated by a computer (Tsai et al., 2008). Subjects 
also show an error-related negativity when observing another’s 
errors (van Schie et al., 2004), and afterwards they also show post-
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